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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH PINTAR, 
Plaintiff-.A. ppellant ~ 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- Case No. 
SION OF UTAH AND COLUM- 9468 
BIA GENEVA STEEL DIVI-
S I 0 N, UN I T E D STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OJ:i-, THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves a claim under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act by Joseph Pintar for medical ex-
penses and temporary disability compensation resulting 
from a back injury suffered by Pintar on or about 
March 29, 1961, and again on or about July 25, 1961, 
while working for Columbia Geneva Steel Division, 
United States Steel. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The case was heard by a Referee and rulings of the 
Referee were affirmed by the Industrial Commission. 
From a verdict and judgment for the defendant, plain-
tiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a 
new hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 29, 1961, while working at the Columbia 
Coal Mine Diviison of Geneva Steel, claimant, Joseph 
Pintar, suffered the first of two injuries involving his 
lumbar (back) spine. Pintar was helping two other 
men do some timbering. At the time of his injury he 
was on a platform in the process of lifting a heavy 
timber into place-"into the shuttle buggy." As he 
was lifting this timber he felt a sharp pain go down his 
·back, especially in the lower portion of his back. He was 
swung around and was bent over by the pain. He was 
eventually able to straighten up by hanging with his 
hands onto the side of the buggy and dropping him-
self. He was then taken out of the mine to the hospital. 
After 4 days in the hospital, where he was kept flat on 
his back in bed, Pintar was returned to work. IIe was 
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able to do only light work, however, as he had consider-
able pain and distress in his back. (R. 1, 2, 8, 11, 16, 
24). 
On July 25, 1961, while working at the Columbia 
Coal Mine Division of Geneva Steel, Pintar had another 
accident. At the time of this accident he was standing 
near a drilling machine, which stands on a hydraulic 
jack. The jack broke and moved the machine back 
against him, pinning him between the machine and the 
wall of the coal mine. In this accident he hurt his ribs, 
neck, back and shoulder. He was taken out of the mine 
and given only two physical therapy treatments. X-
rays were taken which indicated that there was nothing 
broken. The next day Pintar returned to light work 
and managed to get along, having considerable pain 
and distress until October 2, 1961, at which time he was 
placed on a roof driver. This caused considerable pain 
and distress and re-aggravated his chest and shoulder 
complaint, incapacitating him to the extent that he was 
no longer able to work. (R. 2, 14, 16, 24). 
On August 28, 1961, at the request of Columbia 
Geneva Steel, United States Steel Corporation, Pintar 
was examined by Dr. B .• T. Larsen, their Medical Di-
rector for Utah Operations, with respect to the back 
injury suffered by him on March 29, 1961. It was the 
opinon of Dr. B. J. Larsen that Pintar's back com-
plaint was the result of an arthritic condition, which 
had no connection with the March 29 injury. (R. 8). 
On October 17, 1961, Pintar, without permission 
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from the defendants, consulted Dr. Burk M. Snow, an 
orthopedic surgeon in Salt Lake City, who diagnosed 
his complaint as a typical degenerative arthritic lumbar 
spine seen in coal miners and other people dqipg heavy 
work, aggravated by the injuries of March 29 and July 
25, 1961. X-rays were taken which showed a rib fracture 
on the left. Dr. Snow advised Pintar not to do any 
heavy lifting and to wear a chair-type lumbosacral brace 
and rib belt. (R. 4) . 
On December 26, 1961, as the result of an "Appli-
cation to Settle Industrial Accident Claim" filed by 
Pintar, the Industrial Commission appointed a medical 
panel to investigate the medical aspects of said claim 
and report its findings of fact and conclusions to the 
Commission. (R. 18). 
On February 16, 1962, said medical panel found 
and concluded that there was no connection between the 
injuries of March 29 and July 25, 1961, and any per-
manent disability now existing with Pintar. (R. 24). 
As the result of an "Application for Adjustment 
of Claim" filed by Pintar, a hearing was held before a 
referee of ~the Industrial Commission on September 4, 
1962. The referee recommended that the report of the 
medical panel be adopted and that Pintar's claim be 
denied, except that Columbia Geneva Steel, United 
States Steel Corporation, should be ordered to pay for 
brace purchased for_ Pintar's back. (R. 46). 
On December 12, 1962, the Industrial Commission 
adopted the recommended findings of fact and conclu-
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sons of law of the referee and entered its order accord-
ingly. (R. 45). 
Within thirty days thereafter Pintar filed an appli-
cation for rehearing, which was denied by the Industrial 
Commission on February 6, 1962. Pintar then filed a 
petition for a 'Vrit of Certiorari on JVIarch 5, 1962. 
(R. 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT THERE 
WAS NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE INJURIES OF MARCH 29 AND JULY 
25, 1961, AND ANY DISABILITY NOW EX-
ISTING IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND ERRONEOUS AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
It is an undisputed fact that Pintar was involved 
in two accidents while employed by the defendant, Co-
lumbia Geneva Steel Division, United States Steel 
Corporation.· (R. I, 2, 8, 9, 12, 14). There is substan-
tial evidence that prior to these accidents Pindar worked 
for the defendant steel corporation for eleven years 
without any lost time accidents and without being ·off 
work due to his arthritic condition. (R. 2, 5). Also, 
there is substantial evidence that Pintar was capable 
of doing heavy work and was employed to do such work 
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until the time of the first accident. (R. 2, 8, 9}. There 
is little doubt that either of these accidents could have 
and did light up or aggravate Pintar's arthritic con-
dition for which defendant steel corporation would 
have been and is liable. (R. 4, 32, 33, 39). 
The Commission in its conclusions chose to ignore 
the well-established rule of law that aggravation of a 
pre-:-existing condition by an industrial accident is com-
pensable under the act .. This rule is stated in Utah-Idaho 
Cent. R. v. Industrial Commission., 71 Utah 490, 267 
P 785, where the court said: 
"It is no longer an open question in this state 
that, other necessary conditions being present, 
a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condi-
tion of the physical structure of the body, when 
aggravated or lighted up by an accident is com-
pensable under the act." 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBI-
TRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN RE-
JECTING THE CONCLUSIONS OF' DR. 
BURK M. SNOW. 
The Cormriission ignored the conclusions of Dr. 
Burk M. Snow, Orthopedic Surgeon, as stated in his 
letter of October 17, 1961. 
''CONCLUSIONS: From the available his-
tory given by the patient it seems that the only 
conclusion one can come to is that this patient 
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received an aggravation of a previously existing 
degenerative process in the lumbar spine. The 
conditions were present and he had been daily 
on a regular basis with no back complaints prior 
to his injury. The rib complaints certainly are 
industrial." (R. 4). 
These conclusions were ignored for no other reason, it 
would appear, than the misconception that an employee 
does not have the legal right to consult a physician on 
his own without permission of his employer or the In-
dustrial Commission, in Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission~ 73 Utah 535, 275 P. 777, the court 
said: 
"If injured employee himself employs a physi-
cian to attend him, and he is not negligent in 
seeking or employing such physical, but due 
to erroneous diaj.n.os iSj employee has all of his 
teeth unnecessarily extracted, he may recover 
therefor as being attributable to the accident or 
injury, and not due to an independent and inter-
vening cause." 
POINT 3. 
THAT THE ORDER OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION NOT REQUIRING DE-
l?ENDANTS TO PAY ALL .MEDICAL EX-
PENSES IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND 
TO 'rHE FACTS OF TI-lE CASE. 
In the absence of an Apportionment Statute, which 
Utah does not have, the general rule is that the em-
ployer becomes liable for the entire disability resulting 
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from a compensable accident. Therefore, if an enl-
ployee already had only one eye or leg or hand, the 
employer becomes liable for total disability upon the 
loss of the remaining eye, or leg or hand. See Marker 
v. Industrial Commission~ 84 Utah 587, 37 P.2nd 785, 
where the court said: 
"The principle is not limited to cumulation 
resulting ina total disability but may apply to 
a permanent partial award made up in part of 
a pre-existing disability." 
There is no question that each of these accidents was 
compensable. This fact was conclusively established by 
the Commission itself. In its order, the Industrial Com-
mission required the defendant steel company to pay 
for the brace purchased by Pintar for his back upon 
recommendation of Dr. Snow. (R. 45}. 
POINT 4. 
THE REPORT OF DR. BURK M. SNOW 
IS COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE EVI-
DENCE. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is nothing 
in the record which intrinsically discredits the evidence 
provided by Dr. -Snow, which evidence is competent 
and admissible. See H ackford v. Industrial Commis-
sionJ (Utah) 358 P.2d 899, where the court said: 
"In a proceeding to determine disability, the 
Commission properly received into evidence the 
reports of a physician even though they were 
hearsay.'' 
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POINT 5. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS 
NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE 
MEDICAL PANEL. 
Section 35-1-7 U.C.A., 1953, states the Commission 
is not bound by the findings of the medical panel if there 
is other substantial conflicting evidence which supports 
a contrary finding by the Commission. Such evidence 
is available in this case. (R. 4, 32, 33, 39). 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the decision of the Industrial 
Commission is clearly arbitrary and capricious, not sup-
ported by the facts and contrary to law and should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO and 
CLEON B. FEIGHT 
305 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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